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STATUTORY REVISION AND THE PROPOSED
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE
ALEx ErsON*
I
7E ARE, today, in many common law jurisdictions of the coun-
/ try, in the midst of a vital transition period in the form of our
~law. The traditional and distinguishing feature between our-
selves and the civil law countries, the unwritten law and the written law,
the declaratory rule of court decision as opposed to the regulation of the
code, is slowly giving way; we seem to be gravitating toward the Roman
way, the law of the handbook. This evolution is exerting a profound in-
fluence in the legislative and judicial process of today.'
Revision, consolidation and codification of statutes has been a signifi-
cant trend in legislation in recent years. In Illinois this movement has been
notably marked by the Civil Practice Act, the Business Corporation Act,
the submission of a number of important revisionary projects at the pres-
ent session of the General Assembly, and an ever increasing demand for
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x Handbook of the Annual Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1934), 419
lists fifty-three Uniform Laws, which, with the exception of five recently drafted laws, have
been adopted in a number of states. A few of the laws generally enacted and the number of
jurisdictions enacting follow: Aeronautic Acts, twenty-one; Bills of Lading Acts, twenty-nine;
Declaratory Judgments, twenty-one; Desertion and Non-support, nineteen; Fiduciaries, six-
teen; Fraudulent Conveyance Act, sixteen; Limited Partnership Act, twenty; Negotiable In-
struments Law, fifty-three; Partnership Act, twenty; Sales Act, thirty-four; Stock Transfer
Act, twenty-four; Veteran's Guardianship Act, thirty-three; Warehouse Receipts Act, forty-
eight.
The codification of court procedure and of other important branches of the law has been
accomplished in many states.
2 Witness at this session of the Illinois General Assembly, Senate Bill 231 revising all of the
many laws relating to insurance, House Bills 432-530 inclusive which attempt to conform al-
most a hundred statutes to the Civil Practice Act, and House Bills 712-717 which present a
complete revision of the criminal law.
To the knowledge of the writer there are in preparation for submission to the present or
next session of the General Assembly, a revision of the laws relating to probate; a marital rela-
tions act which consolidates all laws relating to marriage, divorce, husband and wife; and a bill
to rewrite all of the complicated provisions relating to revenue and taxation matters.
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the complete revision of all the statutes.3 For the bar generally, revision
and codification holds more interest than mechanical consolidation. 4 The
intense study of the body of statute law with a view toward substantial
improvement has been spurred immeasurably by the activities of the
American Law Institute, the Commissioners of Uniform Laws, and the
legislative proposals of various committees of the American Bar Associa-
tion, state and local bar associations s Active lay groups seeking substan-
tive reforms have also played a large part in the re-examination of the
statute book.6
It is this new fashion in legislation which is partly responsible for the
Draft Code of Criminal Law and Procedure7 of the Illinois Bar Associa-
tion, prepared in cooperation with the Judicial Advisory Council of Cook
County. The greater cause lay in the fundamental need for a restatement
of the criminal law to meet the demands of a mechanized society.8 Not
See "An Act to provide for the codification of the general statutes of the State of Illinois,"
approved June 29, 1927. Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (i933), C. 13x, § ii. An appropriation for this
purpose has been provided each session since 1927. The Legislative Reference Bureau proposed
a number of revisionary bills in 1931 and 1933, but none was enacted.
House Bills 221, 222, 6o5, and Senate Bill 185 of the present session call for the revision of all
the statutes of the State by the Attorney General. This follows the recommendation of the
Section on Classification and Revision of Statutes of the Illinois Bar Association, 23 Ill. Bar J.
79 (1934). Of interest in this connection is the article by Henry Fitts, Duplication in Publica-
tion of Statutes, 23 Ill. Bar J. 44 (1934).
4 This conclusion is based to a certain extent on the legislative reception accorded to the
bills presented by theLegislative Reference Bureau in 1931 and 1933, pursuant to the act which
directed the Bureau to rewrite the statutes. Even though these bills did not change the sub-
stantive law in the slightest degree, no legislator advocated them with enthusiasm and the
attempt of the Bureau to comply with the statutory mandate was abortive.
s Not without credit in this movement are the State Judicial Councils which have often been
effective agencies in legislative reform. More than twenty states have established by law judi-
cial councils charged with the duty of improving the administration of justice through the initi-
ation of legislative proposals. The judicial council movement is discussed in the Report of the
Judicial Advisory Council of the State of Illinois and the Judicial Advisory Council of Cook
County of January, 1931, to Governor Emmerson and the General Assembly, p. 38.
6The report of the Illinois Committee on Child Welfare Legislation of February 3, 1931 to
the Governor and the General Assembly recommending some twenty-seven bills, embracing a
comprehensive plan for the reform of laws relating to children, is a fine example of the contribu-
tion made by non-lawyers. Some of these bills ultimately became law.
7Hereafter referred to as the Draft Code. This Code, published in March 1935, was pre-
sented to the Section on Criminal Law and Its Enforcement and the Board of Governors of the
Illinois Bar Association on March 30, 1935. On April 4, i935, the Code was introduced in the
General Assembly by Representative Benjamin Adamowski as House Bill 712, together with
five companion bills, House Bills 713-717 inclusive.
8 The need for revision is discussed in the Report of the Judicial Advisory Council of Illinois
of 1931, supra n. 5, and the Report of the Sub-committee on Drafting of the Committee on
CriminalLaw and Its Enforcement, presented to the Illinois Bar Association at the I934 annu-
al meeting of the Illinois Bar Association.
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since 1874 has the whole fabric of the law designed to thwart crime been
subject to legislative scrutiny. Legislation for criminals since then has
consisted in the main of sporadic attempts to meet a particular problem
without any effort to work the new offense created into the pattern set by
the revisionists of 1874. The result today is an ill-digested mass of
amendatory acts and an antiquated code often contradictory and incon-
sistent in terms, wholly lacking in organization, in unified philosophy, and
in uniformity of treatment.
It is not necessary further to elaborate the necessity of revision. The
Draft Code presents the most important change in the substantive law of
Illinois suggested in this generation. Making the bold assumptions of the
author's fitness for the purpose, he does not propose to dwell upon the vast
social implications of the Draft Code, nor upon the equally important pro-
cedural changes which it envisages. Rather it is the purpose of this article
to confine itself to a few of the major drafting problems which were pre-
sented in the preparation of the Draft Code. Some of these problems we
may expect to be present in the revision of the criminal law of other states,
and of other branches of statutory law which require revision and codifica-
tion ;9 they are, therefore, worthy of recording in this transitory period of
statutory development.
II
American criminal codes stand out from the rest of the statutory law as
definite attempts to avoid the uncertainty of the unwritten law. His-
torically we have opposed the imposition of penalties except upon a uni-
form fixed basis, and necessity has dictated a statutory basis for the
specification of crimes. ° There has, in most states, been developed, how-
ever, a large body of declaratory law relating to criminal responsibility,
the nature of a criminal act, and similar problems.
The Illinois Criminal Code of 1874" is typical of American criminal
codes. The various crimes are listed in alphabetical order and punish-
ments therefor fixed. Aside from the distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors, which will be discussed later, there is no other attempt at
9 The problems of classification of criminal offenses and other drafting problems in connec-
tion with the revision of the criminal law have been recently studied in New York. See the Re-
port of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York State (1934), 853.
'o Some jurisdictions, however, still allow for the operation of the common law. Thus, as
was pointed out by Ernst Freund (Legislative Regulation (1932), ii), the 1874 Revision (Div.
II, § 20) provides: "All offenses not provided for by statute law may be punished by fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court."
11 "An Act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence," approved March 27,
1874. Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 38. Hereafter referred to as the 1874 revision.
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classification of offenses. The matters of criminal responsibility and of the
nature of the criminal act are discussed in general terms. 2 It is no wonder
that the courts have by many decisions built up a criminal law outside of
the criminal code. The Draft Code, to the extent that it was possible,
attempted to work into the definition of offenses these decisions of the re-
viewing courts. Neither time nor expediency permitted the more ambi-
tious undertaking of truly codifying the entire substantive law in fllinois. 3
The procedural portions of the Draft Code do, however, form a code of
procedure in a more accurate sense.' 4
III
The substantive portion of the Draft Code, Title I to Title IV, consists
in a revision and consolidation of the 1874 Act and more than two hun-
dred acts passed since that date.' s The most important problem in this
connection involved the decision as to which offenses should be excluded
from the Draft Code as not partaking of the true character of a penal
offense. Throughout the statute book there are many hundreds of acts for
which a criminal penalty is provided. What part of these offenses are
properly part of the criminal law? Should not a revision embrace in its
terms all offenses to which a penalty attaches?
Obviously a revision of the criminal code does not call for such an effort.
Were such a revision desired, the practical difficulty of collating, classify-
ing and redrafting these provisions would bar the attempt. Furthermore,
it is clear that such a revision would result in greater confusion and more
difficult access to the law. At the outset, therefore, it was necessary to de-
termine what should be the test for exclusion.
The test adopted was whether the offense in question was regulatory or
penal in character. The criminal law, per se, defines crimes and fixes ap-
propriate treatment. The provisions indiscriminately scattered through-
out the law are in the main parts of statutes which purport to regulate
-Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), C. 38, §§ 617-621.
X3 A project for a model code of the substantive criminal law was discussed at the time of
the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute. See 2o American Bar Assn. J. 333 (1934).
The case for and against codification is discussed by Ernst Freund (Legislative Regulation
(932), par. 2), and Frederick K. Beutel, Some Implications of Experimental Jurisprudence, 48
Harv. L. Rev. i69 (i934).
14 See Titles V to VIII of the Draft Code. These titles are based to a great extent on the
Model Code of Criminal Procedure of the American Law Institute.
IS To be exact, there were two hundred and twenty-nine acts relating to the criminal law
passed since the 1874 revision. Of this number, eighty-two acts were amendatory of the Crim-
inal Code, one hundred and ten were complete in themselves, and thirty-seven were amenda-
tory of acts relating to the criminal law independent of the code.
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conduct and certain acts at the risk of incurring the punishment specified
in the statute. Without the antecedent regulatory provisions, the penalty
which arises from a violation of these provisions would be meaningless.
To include all of these provisions in the revision would mean making a
criminal code out of the entire statute book. Moreover, the criminal law,
having its origin in the concept of crime and guilt, the mores of the group,
changes relatively slowly. 6 Regulatory statutes have as their basic moti-
vating force, public welfare, the police power, a concept which in compari-
son to the criminal law fluctuates rapidly and requires flexible legislative
expedients.
Montesquieu expressed the distinction in these words: "In the exercise
of the police, it is rather the magistrate who punishes than the law; in the
judgment of crimes, it is rather the law which punishes than the magis-
trate."' 17 Thus, on the basis of being regulatory in character, a number of
statutes now found in the chapter on the criminal code in the unofficial
compilations were excluded.
8
Many acts can not be classified easily on the basis of penal or regulatory
statutes. Very often they partake of character similar to both types of
statutes.' 9 Matters which were already regulatory, when incorporated in
the 1874 revision,' have lost this character largely because of their dis-
6 Ernst Freund, Legislature Regulation (1932), p. 12.
"The peculiar province of the criminal law is the punishment of acts intrinsically vicious,
evil and condemned by social sentiment; the province of the police power is the enforcement of
merely conventional restraints, so that in the absence of possible legislative action, there would
be no possible offense." Freund, Police Power (1904), 21.
17 Spirit of the Laws, XXVI, 24.
IS Thus § 30-45, relating to butter; §§ 67-74, relating to bedding; §§ 12ia-i2ie, relating
to carnivals; §§ isia-isii, relating to dance halls; §§ r92a-i92w, relating to the Drug Act;
§§ 274-276, relating to false-stamping of canned goods; § 304-314, relating to itinerant ven-
dors; § 349-35o,,gaso line receptacles; §§ 351-353, storage gasoline; § 497-498, mattresses;
§§ 518-524, relating to mobs; §§ 525-535, relating to sheriff's powers; § 538-541, relating to
shanty boats; §§ 6o4-6o8, relating to criminal identification; §§ 6o8a-6o8o, relating to detec-
tives; § 78oa-78oq, relating to State Bureau of Criminal Identification; §§ 78oh-78on, relat-
ing to radio broadcasting; § 781, relating to expenses of conviction of criminals in other states;
§§ 782-783, relating to payment of fines to humane societies; H3 784-8oo, relating to proba-
tion,-all of Chapter 38, Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (1933); and §§ 2-12, relating to non-support;
§ 73- 81, relating to ophtholmia neonatorium; §§ 119-125, relating to cottonduck; §§ 247
(1)-247(7), relating to commercial fertilizer; §§ 248-255, relating to fire-escapes; § 316(11)-
316(17), relating to horse-racing; § 460-474, relating to paints and oils; and § 487(I)-
487(11), relating to plating,-all of Chapter 38 Cahill's Rev. Stat. (i933), were omitted from
the Draft Code as regulatory in character.
19 The regulation of firearms or of explosives is typical of this character of offense.
20 §§ 4-8 of the Criminal Code relating to the sale of abortifacient drugs, and the adultera-
tion of foods, Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (i933), c. 38, §§ 16-29. and §§ 62 and 63 of the Criminal
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association from the statutes of which they were once an intrinsic part.
Having been part of the Criminal Code for 61 years, to exclude them
would be difficult. If included, into what part of the statute book would
they now fit? In the main, therefore, all provisions contained in the 1874
code, unless obsolete because of their archaic nature, were included. In
the same class belong many short regulatory acts which for many years
have been included by the unofficial compilers of the statutes as part of the
Criminal Code. As for example, the acts regulating firearms, machine guns,
embalming fluids, explosives, advertisements, silver imitations, ticket
scalping and tipping."2 Very often these provisions resembled regulatory
provisions contained in the 1874 revisions.2" Wherever there was this
identity in character so that the matter of working the provisions into the
revision was made simple, temptation led again to exceptions.23 These ex-
ceptions may seem arbitrary, but the justification is the rule of conven-
ience. The bulk of the new offenses made part of the Draft Code have for
many years been in the twilight zone of legislation.24 These offenses were
created by statutes enacted outside of the 1874 revision, but which were
clearly penal in character, punishing objectionable practices growing up
since 1874 and not attempting to regulate in any respect. In truth, be-
cause of the practice of the unofficial compilers of sandwiching these acts
between portions of the Criminal Code, the acts have come to be generally
regarded as part of the Criminal Code.
2 5
Code relating to the labelling of poisonous drugs, Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (i933), c. 38, §§169-
i7o, illustrate the matters so incorporated.
21 See Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (193), c. 38, §§ 141(I)-141(7) (dangerous weapons); §§ i83-
185 (embalming fluid); §§ 207-214 (explosives); §§ 222-223 (advertising); §§ 33o-332 (gold
and silver); §§ 4o9(I)-409(7) (machine guns); §§ 574(I)-574(3) (ticket scalping).
Compare sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) of § i18 of the Draft Code relating to drug violations,
or the provisions of § 121 relating to fraud; these sections are partly taken from the 1874 revi-
sion and partly from acts passed since that time, yet there is a dose identity in matter and pur-
pose throughout.
3Note, for instance, how paragraphs (d), (h), (j), and (i), taken from separate acts, fit
naturally into § IO3 on fifth grade swindling.
24 A glance at § 568, the repealing clause, will indicate how many of such statutes were
grafted into the Draft Code.
2S Although the unofficial compilers have been blamed for this practice (Freund, Legislative
Regulation (1932), 34) an examination of the session laws reveals that by reason of precedent
or otherwise the various secretaries of state have, at least since the 1874 revision, indiscrimi-
nately placed many such acts in thechapter on the Criminal Code, in the session laws, irrespec-
tive of the true nature of the offense. Thus provisions relating to bastardy, to boarding homes
for children, to bedding, to drug regulation, and similar offenses were assigned to Criminal
Code chapters in session laws.
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IV
Another important problem before the drafting committee involved
reconciling the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors26 to the re-
classification of offenses to which the draft was committed.27
It was first planned to do away with the distinction altogether.21 The
new classification, it was hoped, would be a better substitute. The arbi-
trary nature of the distinction, unscientific in its basis, made its abolish-
ment desirable.2 9 But an examination of the statute book revealed that
the desired change could be accomplished only through the passage of a
great many amendatory acts.30 The laws of Illinois fairly bristle with
references to 'felonies' and 'misdemeanors.'-3 Furthermore, the long tra-
dition of the distinction in the many court precedents acted as an addi-
tional barrier. Because of these practical impediments the committee felt
constrained to retain the distinction as collateral to the classification. 3'
This action, although in truth dictated by expediency, is not inconsistent
with the purposes of the draft. The old distinction now serves the sole
purpose of reconciling the Draft Code with the terminology of the statute
book.33 In terms of the distinction, crimes of the first and second grade
would be felonies; the lesser grades of crimes, misdemeanors. Elsewhere
26 This distinction is set out in § 5 of Division II of the 1874 revision providing, "A felony is
an offense punishable with death'or by imprisonment in the penitentiary," and § 6 of Division
II which provides, "Every other offense is a misdemeanor ..... " See Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat.
(1933), c. 38, § 614.
27 The Draft Code provides for a classification of all offenses into six grades according to the
seriousness of the offenses. For a list of the offenses in each grade see §§ 11, 22, 41, 66, 87 and
io8.
28 Report of the Sub-committee on Drafting of the Committee on Criminal Law and Its
Enforcement, supra note 8.
'9 A similar sentiment is expressed in the Report of the Commission on the Administration
of Justice in New York State (1934), 869.
30 A possible alternative would be the use of the device of legislation by reference. An
amendment of the Statutory Interpretation Act, together with appropriate language in the
Draft Code may possibly be a method of avoiding statutory multiplicity. The device has met
with some criticism among draftsmen (Lord Thring, Practical Legislation, 48-58). An addi-
tional objection would exist in the necessity of giving the amendment and the Draft Code a
retrospective effect. This device was distrusted in the movement to conform all statutes to the
terminology of the Civil Practice Act. See House Bills 432-530 inclusive of the present session.
"1 A study made by the Associate Committee on the Amendment of the Law, of the Chicago
Bar Association reveals three hundred and nine misdemeanors and thirty-two felonies pro-
vided for outside of the criminal code.
"Preface to Draft Code, page IV.
33 Thus §§ 3 and 4 of the Draft Code keep the definitions found in the z874 revision; see
supra note 26 § 5 provides:
"Without reference to the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, all offenses shall
be classified into six grades as follows: (i) crimes of the first grade; (2) crimes of the second
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in the Draft Code, all punishments provided for in the statute book out-
side the Criminal Code are classified in accordance with the division of
crimes provided by the Draft Code. 34 By this device the same end has, in
effect, been achieved and in time it is hoped that the words felony and
misdemeanor will be regarded as archaic and wholly unnecessary.
V
The structural organization of the Draft Code is designed to overcome
the defects of most existing penal statutes. An examination of almost any
section of the present Code reveals a mingling of the following elements:
the definition of the offense sought to be punished, revisions relating to
attempt and to accessoryship, the penalty to be imposed, provisions re-
lating to procedure or to evidentiary matters, and provisions setting
standards for exoneration and exemption.3 5
The obvious advantage of such a section is that it is complete in itself
and there is no necessity to refer to other sections of the Criminal Code for
guidance. The disadvantages are that: (i) the legislature is prone to pass
an entire new act to cover a specific offense without attempting to recon-
cile the new provision with the Criminal Code3 6
(2) When a section is added to the Criminal Code, because of its com-
pleteness, there is no compelling necessity to examine the rest of the Code,
and often lack of uniformity in definition, penalty and circumstances of
excuse or exoneration results.
grade; (3) crimes of the third grade; (4) crimes of the fourth grade; (S) crimes of the fifth grade;
(6) petty offenses.
34 § r58 provides treatment in accordance with the six divisions of offenses of the Draft
Code for all offenses not defined in the Draft Code.
3s A typical section is § 57 of the Criminal Code, Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933) c. 38, § 145:
"Whoever keeps or maintains a house of ill fame or place for the practice of prostitution or
lewdness, or whoever patronizes the same, or lets any house, room or other premises for any
such purpose, or shall keep a common, ill-governed and disorderly house, to the encouragement
of idleness, gaming, drinking, fornication or other misbehavior, shall be fined not exceeding two
hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail or house of correction for a period of not more
than one year or both. When the lessee or keeper of a dwelling house or other building is con-
victed under this section, the lease for contract for letting the premises shall, at the option of
the lessor, become void, and the lessor may have the like remedy to recover the possession as
against a tenant holding over after the expiration of his term. And whoever shall lease to an-
other any house, room, or other premises, in whole or in part, for any of the uses or purposes
punishable under this section, or knowingly permits the same to be so used or occupied, shall be
fined not exceeding two hundred dollars, or imprisoned in the county jail or house of correction
for a period of not more than one year, or both, and the house or premises so leased, occupied or
used shall be held liable for and be sold for any judgment obtained under this section, but if
such building or premises belongs to a minor or other person under guardianship, then the
guardian or conservator and his property shall be liable instead of such ward, and his property
shall be subject to be sold for the payment of said judgment."
36 Glaring examples of this practice exist particularly with reference to gambling, prostitu-
tion and malicious mischief. In all of these offenses, the pressure of special interest groups
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(3) Systematic and planned treatment of criminal offenders is discour-
aged and, in fact, made impossible by the confusion which arises through
inconsistencies caused by the sporadic use of the section complete in
itself.37
(4) Construction by the courts and the bar is made more difficult and
confusing to the extent that the courts are compelled to discourage the
use of the language of the statute38
(5) The section complete in itself is apt to be overly long, replete with
provisos and gutted with references here, there and everywhere.
To overcome these difficulties the Draft Code provides for the separa-
tion of the elements referred to. Title I includes among other general pro-
visions definitions for assault, attempt and accessoryship which eliminate
the necessity of referring to these situations in each offense. Title II is
limited solely to the definitions of crimes and petty offenses. Title III is
limited to circumstances of exemption and exoneration. Title IV em-
braces all penalties and other treatment accorded to offenders. Title V to
Title VIII include all procedural matters.
The real drafting contribution of the Draft Code lies in the fact that its
structure will automatically compel future legislatures to prepare amend-
ments to the criminal law in accordance with the classification of the Code.
Hereafter, the legislative draftsman will have to ask the legislative pro-
ponent, what grade offense do you regard this? Once this question is an-
swered, the remaining mechanics of amendment are simple. They consist
only in the addition of a new definition to the grade of offense to which the
amendment relates. All the other necessary provisions, penalty, proce-
dure, exoneration and exemption, will immediately attach.
Although a code is probably the highest form of legislative expression,
causes the enactment of separate acts at almost every session of the General Assembly. As a re-
sult, these offenses proved the most difficult to reconcile and organize. See §§ 59, 62 and 77 of
the Draft Code. As pointed out, supra note x5, of two hundred and twenty-nine acts relating
to the criminal law enacted since 1874, one hundred and ten were acts complete in themselves.
An examination of these acts discloses that most of the offenses defined could have been written
into the Criminal Code.
37 Note the variations in punishment for altering the mark or brand of a mule or domestic
fowl and the identification number of an automobile. For the former the penalty is imprison-
ment in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than three years if the value exceeds
$1S.oo; for the latter a fine not to exceed $200.00 or imprisonment in the county jail for a
period not to exceed six months.
Stealing a horse is punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary from three to twenty
years, stealing a motor vehicle, from one to twenty years.
38 See People v. Garines, 314 Il. 413, 145 N.E. 699 (1924), in which a charge of self-defense
in the language of § 149 of the Criminal Code was held improper, the court stating that this
section did not give the jury any accurate knowledge of the law.
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it remains so only if it is not constantly subjected to haphazard planless
amendment. The 1874 revision did not project itself beyond the year of
its enactment because it provided no method of moulding future changes
in the criminal law. As a result, the i874 revision today forms, perhaps at
the most, one half of the substantive criminal law. As has been indicated
it is entirely lacking in organization, devoid of a uniform philosophy or
method of treatment, and distinguished only by confusion in thought and
in detail. It is thus hoped, by virtue of the structural organization, that
the Draft Code will not meet with the same disintegration in the course
of time as did the 1874 revision: that unity will remain unity and that the
harmony wrested from the existing law will continue.
VI
In order effectively to carry through the structural organization, def-
initions were resorted to freely. Although the 1874 revision contained a
definition of assault,39 attempt,4 0 and accessoryship before the fact,4' these
definitions were not intended as legislative shortcuts. Repeatedly,
throughout the many sections of the 1874 revision, there is an effort to
cover all of these situations without making avail of the definitions. By
the use of three broad definitions, 42 the necessity of embracing the situa-
tion of an assault, an attempt, or an accessoryship in each section defining
an offense is eliminated. A great saving of language is accomplished by
this device. There is also the added virtue of the assurance that every
definition of an offense includes assault, attempt and accessoryship. In a
lesser way the other definitions included under Title I operated to redeem
the bulk of the bill.
In an effort further to clarify and reorganize definition of offenses,
groups of offenses with common characteristics were brought together.
Thus all the fraudulent offenses, obtaining money under false pretenses, by
false personation, by false financial statement, checks or other writing,
and similar frauds, were grouped under the section on swindling. The
theftuous offenses, embracing larceny by bailee, embezzlement, receiving
stolen property, conversion of moneys, thefts by officers and by other per-
sons acting in a fiduciary capacity, were placed in the section on theft.
Malicious mischief embraced a variety of offenses against the property of
the public, railroads, telegraph companies, newspapers, and other special
39 §§ 20, 23, of the 1874 Revision, Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), C. 38, §§32-34.
40 § i of Division II of the 1874 Revision, Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 38, § 6zo.
4' §§ 2 and 17 of Division II of the 1874 revision, Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), C. 38,
§§61r, 626.
4 §§ 6, 7, and 8 of the Draft Code.
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interests. 43 By this method of grouping, and by the use of the definitions
and the economy of the structural organization, the 671 sections of the
statute book now devoted to the substantive criminal law were reduced to
175 sections.44
VII
The classification of offenses in any criminal code necessarily must be
the expression of the underlying social philosophy of the time. Its deter-
mination therefore is more a question for the policy maker than for the
draftsman. Nevertheless the classification adopted fundamentally shapes
the architecture of the draft.
The first criminal code of Illinois, adopted one year following the incor-
poration of the state, merely listed offenses, without so much as arranging
them in alphabetical order. 45 The criminal code of 1827 more nearly ap-
proached modem codes, and through an organization of seventeen divi-
sions classified offenses according to the nature of the offense. 46 The 1845
revision presented a much more expanded code and again offenses were
distinguished on the basis of their nature.47 The present code presented
as part of the ambitious revision of all the statutes in 1874, interest-
ingly enough abandons the division according to the nature of the of-
fense, which in the interim had become popular in other states,48 and
is content with a simple arrangement of offenses according to the al-
phabet.
The Draft Code rejects all of the antecedent classifications and presents
as its most important project a classification of offenses into six grades
according to the severity of the punishment. Apart from what may be
said for or against the policy of division on this basis, there was at once
43 §§ 34, 38, 40, 59, 64, 65 of the Draft Code.
44 This is based on Chapter 38 of the Smith-Hurd Revised Statutes (1933). It is to be re-
membered, however, that certain sections were omitted as regulatory. See supra note 18.
45 "An Act respecting Crimes and Punishment," approved March 23, r8rg, lists the follow-
ing offensesin the order named: treason, murder, manslaughter, riots, larceny, forgery, usurpa-
tion, assault and battery, fraudulent deed, disobedience of children and servants, obtaining
goods by fraudulent pretenses, arson, hog stealing, maiming and disfiguring, rape, sodomy,
bigomy (spelling of statute) and forcible and stolen marriages, perjury.
46 The divisions of offenses were: crimes against the government and people; crimes and
offenses against the person; crimes and offenses against habitations and other buildings; crimes
and offenses relative to property; forgery and counterfeiting; crimes and offenses against public
justice; offenses against the public peace and tranquillity; offenses against the public morality,
health and police; offenses committed by cheats, swindlers and other fraudulent persons;
fraudulent and malicious mischief; offenses relative to slaves, indentured servants and ap-
prentices.
47 The divisions of offenses were identical with the 1827 code.
48 Thirty states classify their crimes according to type.
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presented the problem of arrangement of offenses within each grade.49
The plan which seemed to afford the greatest ease in organization and in
presentation was that of listing the offenses in alphabetical order in each
grade.5 ° In order to effectuate this plan another unique device was resort-
ed to that of giving to each offense a descriptive label. There are three
additional reasons for this method. If the label is sufficiently descriptive,
it acts as a short digest of the definition and presents the important part
of the section first; the labels operate to make the method of definition
more uniform; the labels in time will become currently used to describe the
crime defined.
Labels which are new and which illustrate the technique employed are:
trafficking in explosives; escape; falsification of financial statement:
swindling theft; malconduct toward children; tampering with witnesses;
official misconduct. Occasionally it was difficult to get a label sufficiently
descriptive to convey the exact connotation desired. It was then that the
ingenuity of the drafting committee was taxed to the extreme and its
members ventured into long epistemological excursions."s
VIII
It is not submitted that the problems5 2 herein briefly dealt with have
found their perfect solution in the Draft Code. Experience with the Code
reinforces the conclusion that revision of important branches of the law
cannot be governed entirely by ordinary rules of draftsmanship, that leg-
islative expedients must be devised to meet the exigencies of the body of
law under examination. Only by intensive additional study will standards
of legislation peculiarly adapted to codification emerge.
49 The Report of the Commission on the Administration of Justice in New York (1934), 875
devotes considerable attention to this matter.
so The other alternatives, such as division on the basis of the type of crime, or the social
interest sought to be protected, were thought too cumbersome for practical use. By way of
facilitating the locating of offenses each grade of offense is preceded by a section listing the
offenses within the grade in alphatitical order.
st Amusing discussions arose over possible labels. A suggested label for criminal banking,
for instance, was banking malversation.
52 Each of these problems could well form the subject of a separate article. Other problems
are worthy of comment if space permitted. Particular attention should be called to § 568 of the
Draft Code setting up a detailed saving clause of a type unusual in Illinois. Its provisions were
adopted to avoid any doubt which might arise because of the conflicting decisions of the Su-
preme Court. The confusion which arose after the enactment of the Civil Practice Act because
of the general saving clause served as an example to the drafting committee.
Farmer v. People, 77 Ill. 322 (z874); People v. Zito, 237 Ill. 434, 86 N.E. o4i (19o9);
Merlo v. Coal and Mining Company, 258 Il. 328, ioi N.E. 525 (1913); Wall v. Chesapeake
and Ohio Ry. Co., 290 Ill. 227, 125 N.E. 20 (1919), 256 U.S. 125 (1921); Vulcan Detinning Co.
v. The Industrial Commission, 295 Il. 141, 128 N.E. 917 (1920). See also Sutherland, Statu-
tory Construction (2d. Ed. [by Lewis] 19o4), § 256 ff., § 355.
It is interesting to contrast the saving clause of the Draft Code with that of the 1827 Crim-
inal Code, Rev. Laws of Illinois (z827), 168.
